𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

29 June 2026 04:08

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The Vocabulary of the Qurʾān and Multilingualism in Arabia

By Orhan Elmaz, University of St Andrews

This article examines five Qurʾānic lexical items, surādiq (Q 18:29), qiṭṭ (Q 38:16), ḥiṭṭah (Q 2:58; 7:161), fūm (Q 2:61), and yaqṭīn (Q 37:146), through a theoretical framework that combines multilingualism in Arabia before Islam with muqārana, understood as comparative philological practice. Rather than simply asking whether each word is Arabic or foreign, the article evaluates each case through Qurʾānic context, Arabic morphology and lexicography, phonotactic markedness, comparative Semitic, Iranian, and Mediterranean evidence, variant readings (qirāʾāt), and early exegetical reception (tafsīr). Surādiq illustrates Iranian–Aramaic mediation in eschatological imagery; qiṭṭ and ḥiṭṭah show how documentary and religious-formulaic semantics may preserve older Semitic contact strata; fūm demonstrates how a Qurʾānic food term can be pulled between an archaic Arabic grain/bread meaning, non-canonical reading tradition, and harmonisation via Biblical comparison; and yaqṭīn functions as a control case against the over-identification of borrowings. The article argues that Qurʾānic vocabulary is best studied as multilingual lexical memory: a field in which etymology and exegesis interact without collapsing into a binary opposition between Arabic and foreign vocabulary.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/rel17070759

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Tags: #Quran #Philology #Multilingualism #QuranicStudies #SemiticLanguages

𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

29 June 2026 04:00

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Nature’s Complexity Alive: Farewell to Several Unificatory Cosmological Arguments for Monism

By Lok-Chi Chan, National Taiwan University

Throughout history, numerous thinkers have claimed that monism, in the form of priority monism, existence monism, monotheistic monism, or versions that posit an extra-cosmic ultimate being, theoretically surpasses pluralism, above all by positing a unified universe. This view re-emerges in recent metaphysics through what I call cosmological arguments from parsimony (CAPs) and cosmological arguments from relations (CARs). According to CAPs, monism is more ontologically parsimonious than pluralism because it posits only one fundamental entity. According to CARs, the single fundamental object in monism serves as a required metaphysical explanans for how things in the universe can form certain relations with each other. I argue that this longstanding tradition of arguments spanning Neoplatonism, early and late modern philosophy, analytic philosophy, and even some Eastern traditions fails: monistic frameworks largely fail to reduce the universe’s ontological complexity as alleged, and the remaining ones fail to show any theoretical advantage over pluralism for related reasons. Drawing on the broader materialist tradition, the article also offers a positive case for several theoretical merits of pluralism and ends with a takeaway concerning how best to inquire into the universe’s unity.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70051

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Tags: #Metaphysics #Monism #Pluralism #Cosmology #Philosophy

𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

29 June 2026 03:48

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Life, but Not as We Know It: Why Fine-Tuning Arguments Fail

By Joe Gough, University of Oxford

Definitions of “life” and theories of life are systematically neglected in arguments for and from fine-tuning. Despite claims to be neutral about the definition of “life,” fine-tuning arguments generally presuppose that life requires a form of structural complexity only afforded by physicochemical complexity of the sort with which we are familiar, and more specifically, by water and carbon molecules. Conversely, our best accounts of life construe life as a matter of dynamic rather than structural complexity, and as substrate- and scale-independent. Life could be as radically different in the possible universes considered as their physics is. We have no idea whether the relevant form of dynamic complexity would develop in possible universes radically physically unlike our own.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.70052

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Tags: #FineTuning #PhilosophyOfReligion #PhilosophyOfScience #Cosmology #Life

𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

27 June 2026 09:36

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Imagining God

By Kathryn A. Johnson, Arizona State University

Introduces the topic of God representations in monotheistic traditions. Section 2 examines belief in the authoritarian (e.g., controlling and punishing) and benevolent (e.g., helping and forgiving) attributes of God as a person-like being. The discussion is expanded in Section 3 to include abstract representations (e.g., the Universe, Nature, and negative theology). Section 4 describes measures used to assess people’s beliefs about God and presents survey data of group differences in beliefs about God as authoritarian and benevolent. Section 5 addresses the under-studied question: where is God? Representations of God do not exist in a vacuum, and Section 6 explores the cognitive building blocks, life circumstances, worldviews, and personal motivations that can inform diverse God representations. Finally, Section 7 concludes with an overview of some of the antecedents and outcomes of God representations surveyed in this Element and how they relate to various ways of thinking about, relating to, and imagining God.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009527842

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Tags: #PsychologyOfReligion #GodConcept #CognitiveScience #Monotheism #ReligiousBelief

𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

27 June 2026 09:34

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The hierarchical grounding argument for a necessary being: from contingency to divine attributes

By Nidhal Mghirbi, Independent Researcher

We present a modal argument for a necessary being that distinguishes hierarchical grounding relations to address traditional objections to cosmological proofs. By separating intra-temporal grounding (dependencies within temporal order) from ultimate grounding (atemporal existential foundation), we demonstrate that contingent reality requires necessary grounding even if temporal causal chains extend infinitely. Employing S5 modal logic under an actualist interpretation, we prove that well-founded grounding hierarchies terminate in a unique necessary being, whose necessity is established through an exhaustive modal dichotomy applied to the actual terminus of the hierarchy. This being possesses traditional divine attributes including simplicity, immateriality, timelessness, and causal maximality, derived deductively from necessary existence together with the explanatory requirements of ultimate grounding. Our hierarchical framework resolves objections from quantum indeterminacy, eternal cosmologies, and self-sustaining systems while addressing Kantian concerns about applying causation beyond temporal domains. The argument establishes that metaphysical analysis of contingency structures necessarily entails a timeless foundation transcending the natural order.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-026-10020-y

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Tags: #PhilosophyOfReligion #CosmologicalArgument #Metaphysics #Grounding #NecessaryBeing

𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

27 June 2026 09:26

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The near miss modal ontological argument for atheism

By D. Gene Witmer & Micah Edvenson, University of Florida

The argument for atheism from the problem of evil can be strengthened by taking advantage of the traditional view that God’s existence, if possible, is necessary. Given that, if there is just one possible world in which there are evils that cannot be reconciled with God’s existence, God does not exist in any world. This argument has been tried before, but the major obstacle it faces is that in appealing to situations much worse than any in the actual world, the genuine possibility of the imagined situations might reasonably be called into question. We argue that this obstacle can be overcome by considering a couple of “near misses”: situations that seem obviously possible because they nearly happened. We identify two such situations and defend two critical claims. The first is that, absent any independent warrant for theism, there is excellent reason to believe these situations are genuinely possible. The second is that in the worlds thus delineated, there are evils that cannot be excused by any plausible theodicy. Call this the argument from possible inexcusable evil. Our main thesis is the modest one that absent independent warrant for theism, the argument from possible inexcusable evil is a cogent argument for atheism. Further, however, we suggest that a stronger thesis may be warranted, since the way the argument works may well block independent evidence for theism, at least, independent evidence of the sort that is especially relevant in the context of disputes over the significance of evil.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-026-10018-4

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Tags: #PhilosophyOfReligion #Atheism #ProblemOfEvil #ModalLogic #Ontology

𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

27 June 2026 09:21

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The Metaphysics of Fasting

By Ismail Lala, Gulf University for Science & Technology

This study investigates the metaphysics of fasting according to the hugely influential mystic Muhyi al-Din ibn ‘Arabi (d. 638/1240). Ibn ‘Arabi argues that fasting holds an unparalleled position in ritual worship. While his predecessor Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111) in his magnum opus—The revival of the religious sciences (Ihya’ ‘ulum al-din)—addresses the ethical dimension of fasting, Ibn ‘Arabi’s concern is the metaphysical reality of it. There are six principal reasons Ibn ‘Arabi gives for fasting being superior to other forms of worship, all of which revolve around fasting’s uniqueness that adverts to the uniqueness of God: (1) Fasting is elevated because God has connected it to Himself in prophetic traditions. All other acts of worship are connected to humans. Fasting is thus elevated from the servant to God. (2) Fasting is not an action like other forms of worship; it is an inaction since it entails refraining from eating, drinking, and sexual intercourse. This makes its essence incomprehensible as it is not an entity but the lack of one. The incomprehensibility of the essential inaction of fasting connects it to the incomprehensibility of God. (3) Fasting, insofar as it displays independence from food, drink, and sexual intercourse, mirrors the divine attribute of true independence from all things (samadaniyya). (4) Fasting is described as a shield (junna) in prophetic traditions because although it is not an action in itself, the state of fasting becomes a protection against evil actions. Awareness of God (taqwa), likewise, protects against evil actions. Thus, fasting is related to God as it begets awareness of God. (5) The breath of the person who fasts, though malodourous to humans, is said to be fragrant for God by Prophet Muhammad. This ‘fragrance’ is produced by the breath of the person who fasts, which adverts to the Breath of the Compassionate (nafas al-Rahman) that brings all things into existence according to Ibn ‘Arabi. (6) The people who fast shall enter heaven through the Gate of Rayyan (quenched thirst) as reported in prophetic traditions. Ibn ‘Arabi argues that the quenching of thirst represents an endpoint or ‘perfection’ (kamal) after which one does not require more drink. This ‘perfection’ (of satiation) mirrors God’s perfection. Fasting is the only form of worship that has a gate that alludes to its perfection, which demonstrates that it is unique. In all these ways, then, there is nothing like fasting, which connects it to God because there is nothing like God.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/rel17060672

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Tags: #IbnArabi #IslamicMetaphysics #Fasting #IslamicPhilosophy #Spirituality

𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

27 June 2026 09:16

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Countering Extremist Rhetoric: An Islamic Approach to Civility in the Digital Age

By Zeki Saritoprak, John Carroll University

This article explores an Islamic theological approach to navigating social media and digital communication. It highlights that, while instantaneous global communication possesses the power to cause immense societal harm or foster community solidarity, Islam views technology as inherently neutral. The ethical value of any technological tool is determined entirely by whether it is used for the betterment or destruction of humanity. Drawing from the Qur’an and hadith, the article emphasises the vital concepts of husn al-khuluq (beautiful manners) and al-kalim al-tayyib (good words), framing digital communication not merely as casual interaction, but as a highly accountable moral act. To bridge classical theology with modern platforms, the writings of 20th century Islamic scholar Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, whose teachings include the mass reach of radio, are presented as a direct analogue to today’s social media landscape. Nursi’s framework demonstrates how digital platforms multiply the spiritual weight of our words, exponentially increasing the burden of sins like slander and backbiting, as well as the rewards for positive, truthful speech. Ultimately, the article concludes that maintaining civility online is not just about politeness; it is a “cosmic duty” to align human interactions with universal harmony.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.55831/ajis.v11i3.1473

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Tags: #IslamicEthics #DigitalMedia #SaidNursi #SocialMedia #CounteringExtremism

𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

27 June 2026 09:07

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Open Theism and the Contingent A Priori

By Jonas Werner, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin

Theological fatalists hold that divine omniscience is incompatible with free will. The most prominent argument for fatalism involves the premiss that in the remote past, god already knew what you would do today. In a recent paper in this journal, Fabio Lampert proposes a variant of this argument that only requires that god knew a contingent a priori logical truth. The open theist holds that in the remote past, it was indeterminate what you would do. This helps the open theist to respond to the original argument. I show that the indeterminacy acknowledged by the open theist also provides them with resources to respond to Lampert’s variant. They can motivate that some necessities are up to us and still accept that the theorems of the logic of actuality relevant to Lampert’s argument are determinately true.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaf077

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Tags: #PhilosophyOfReligion #OpenTheism #FreeWill #DivineForeknowledge #Logic

𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

23 May 2026 16:24

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The Weight of the Invisible: Max Scheler and Mullā Ṣadrā on Non-Objectual Experience

By Tareq Ayoub, Western University

This article argues that suffering exemplifies a distinctive mode of objectless yet meaningful experience that challenges the assumption that intuition must be grounded in the presence of a determinate object. Drawing on phenomenological and metaphysical resources, it brings Max Scheler’s phenomenology of feeling into dialogue with Mullā Ṣadrā’s ontology of graded existence to reconceptualize the epistemic and ontological status of pain. Against views that treat non-objectual experiences as merely subjective or epistemically deficient, the paper contends that suffering discloses a structured form of meaning that operates before and beyond object-based cognition. Scheler’s account of emotional intentionality is shown to illuminate how suffering reveals value and orientation without presenting an identifiable object, disclosing instead an invisible dimension of life as inhibited, fractured, or diminished. This non-objectual disclosure, while irreducible to sensory intuition, nevertheless grounds judgment and meaningful comportment toward the world. Ṣadrā’s metaphysics of tashkīk al-wujūd deepens this account by situating suffering within an ontology in which experience corresponds to graded intensities of being. On this view, suffering indexes a real ontological deficiency or limitation—neither sheer non-being nor objectifiable presence—that is known indirectly through its experiential effects. By integrating Scheler’s phenomenology with Ṣadrā’s doctrine of the primacy and gradation of existence, the article shows that suffering functions as an experiential access point to the invisible, where epistemology and ontology converge. The limits of intuition thus appear not as boundaries of knowledge, but as sites where non-objectual disclosure enables meaningful judgment about being itself.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/rel17050609

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Tags: #MullaSadra #Phenomenology #Philosophy #Metaphysics #Suffering

𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

17 May 2026 10:05

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New Religious Movements in Islam

By Mark Sedgwick, Aarhus University

New Religious Movements (NRMs) have emerged periodically from the formative period of Islam to the present day. This Element considers a representative sample, organized by chronological period and then by type. In earlier periods, particular features of Islam either encouraged or discouraged the emergence of NRMs. Modernity brought new conditions that led to new types of NRM, the focus of this Element. Initially, NRMs arose in resistance to modernity or in support of it. Then came NRMs adjusted to the age of mass modernity. The Element also examines Western NRMs of Islamic origin or coloring. All these NRMs are understood in terms of their relationship with the dominant religious community, the host society, and political authority, as well as the novelty of their beliefs and practice.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009349338

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Tags: #Islam #Religion #NewReligiousMovements #Modernity #SociologyOfReligion

𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

11 May 2026 17:58

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Monotheism and the Trinity

By Eric Yang, Santa Clara University

The doctrine of the Trinity stands at the heart of Christian theology, yet its claim of three divine persons raises enduring questions about compatibility with monotheism. This work begins by presenting the logical problem the Trinity appears to pose, followed by a survey of existing solutions and their critiques. Drawing on historical insights into the doctrine’s development, it proposes an approach in which doctrinal claims are interpreted with minimal content, thereby avoiding formal contradiction. Rather than privileging a single solution, the study suggests that multiple theological models can be used in tandem, offering complementary perspectives that deepen understanding of God and the doctrine of the Trinity.

DOI: Not available

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Tags: #PhilosophyOfReligion #Theology #Christianity #Monotheism #Metaphysics

𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

11 May 2026 17:53

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Aristotelian Ontological Priority and Metaphysical Grounding

By Bryan C. Reece, Baylor University

Many philosophers hold that reality is structured such that some beings are more fundamental than others, a structure often described in terms of “grounding.” Grounding is typically understood as explanatory and governed by properties like asymmetry, irreflexivity, and transitivity. Aristotle’s notion of ontological priority, which inspired contemporary discussions of grounding, appears to share these features. This work clarifies Aristotle’s account of ontological priority, examines its relationship to other forms of priority, and explores its relevance to modern grounding theory. It also addresses Aristotle’s “Priority Problem,” where certain examples seem to undermine the coherence of ontological priority. The study argues that Aristotle offers a principled solution to these challenges, and that a grounding-theoretic analogue of this solution can help resolve recent objections within contemporary metaphysics.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009433617

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Tags: #Philosophy #Metaphysics #Aristotle #Ontology #Grounding

𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

11 May 2026 17:49

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The ground of beings cannot be a being: a grounding-theoretic argument

By Jorge C. Lucero, University of Brasília

What grounds the existence of beings? This paper argues that if the existence of beings (rather than nothing) admits of an account and grounding is irreflexive, the ground of beings cannot itself be a being. The argument proceeds by elimination. If we ask what accounts for there being anything at all, four options present themselves: the ground is among the beings it grounds (self-grounding), there is no ground (brute fact), there is an infinite regress of grounds, or the ground is trans-categorial. Self-grounding generates incoherence: it violates grounding’s irreflexivity, collapses into explanatory vacuity, and produces priority inversion. Brute fact, while coherent, denies that the existence of beings as such admits of any account. Infinite regress defers explanation without terminus. What remains, for those who hold that reality is ultimately intelligible, is a ground outside the domain it grounds: not an entity among entities. This conclusion aligns with classical theism’s doctrine that God is ipsum esse subsistens: not a being that exists, but subsistent existence itself. The argument establishes a structural place that classical theism recognizes as “God.”

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-026-10013-9

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Tags: #Philosophy #Metaphysics #PhilosophyOfReligion #Theism #Ontology

𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

02 May 2026 18:48

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Fine-Tuning Problems for Single-Universe Naturalists

By Akshay Gupta, Wake Forest University

The ‘fine-tuning’ of the universe has led many individuals to infer the existence of a designer, a multiverse, or something else that can account for it. Yet proponents of a view known as single-universe naturalism have certain responses they can make to block the inference from fine-tuning to a designer or multiverse. In this paper, I argue that these responses fail to block this inference. For instance, I raise and develop the uncertainty problem, which pertains to single-universe naturalists who deny that we can assign any probability to fine-tuning. I also argue that there are problems with other responses that single-universe naturalists can make to try to account for fine-tuning, such as the response that the universe’s constants are necessary or the response that there are no probabilistic mechanisms responsible for fine-tuning.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzag015

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Tags: #Philosophy #PhilosophyOfReligion #Metaphysics #FineTuning #Atheism

𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

29 June 2026 04:06

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How Theists Can Answer the “Why Be Moral?” Question: An Indirect Reason-Generation Account

By Justin Morton, University of Texas

In this paper, I give a new type of theistic answer to the “Why be moral?” question. After briefly clarifying the version of the question I’m concerned with, as well as extant theistic answers to the question, I argue for a new kind of answer. Roughly, while on standard answers, future (post death) benefits directly generate present reason to be moral, on my view, they only do so indirectly. On my view, we only have present reason to be moral because we will have reason to be moral in the afterlife. I propose a principle of reason inheritance that would justify this proposal. I also argue for my view, over the standard view: it alone can account for Prichard’s Dilemma. Finally, I show how my proposal entails two interesting theses: a bodily eschaton and a loose type of purgatory.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.70015

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Tags: #Ethics #PhilosophyOfReligion #Theism #MoralPhilosophy #Afterlife

𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

29 June 2026 03:58

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Beyond Rote Learning: A Scoping Review of the Education-Related Effects of Quran Memorisation

By Muhammad Fakhruddin Al-Razi, Universitas Negeri Surabaya Fitri Kusumasari, Universidade Dili

As modern education trends emphasise deep understanding, critical thinking, and creativity, there is a need to re-evaluate the practice of memorising the Quran, which is increasingly being questioned. This article engages with this discourse by conducting a scoping review of empirical studies regarding the education-related effects of Quran memorisation. Following the PRISMA-ScR guidelines, 36 empirical studies were identified and analysed. The findings indicate that Quran memorisation may best be conceptualised as a multifaceted educational phenomenon, with outcomes clustered into three key themes: cognitive enhancement and potential neuroplasticity, academic achievement, and psychospiritual character development. Framed within the liturgical literacy and neurobiological lens, these results suggest that Quran memorisation functions as embodied cognition and as a stimulation for synaptic connectivity rather than passive repetition. Furthermore, the review highlights a dominance of studies from the Indo-Malay region and a prevalence of quantitative observational designs. The article concludes that while the current mapping offers a positive outlook on the pedagogical value of memorisation, future research requires more rigorous experimental designs and broader geographical contexts to further substantiate these findings.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/01416200.2026.2688399

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Tags: #QuranMemorisation #IslamicEducation #CognitiveScience #Neuroplasticity #EducationalResearch

𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

29 June 2026 03:43

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Kalām, Humans and AI: Reason(ing), Creation/Creativity, and Agency

By Nidhal Guessoum, American University of Sharjah

Artificial intelligence, particularly after the recent explosive advances and widened uses, has fired up the (previously quiet) debates about the nature of reasoning, creativity, and agency. This paper examines these issues through the lens of classical kalām (Islamic theology), with some focus on Muʿtazilite principles. It begins by presenting a concise overview of the major schools of kalām (Muʿtazilism, Ashʿarism, and Māturīdism), highlighting their respective treatments of reason (ʿaql), divine creation, and human action. Then a brief review of modes of reasoning is provided, shedding light on differences between human and artificial reasoning, stressing the distinction between statistically generated outputs and contextually grounded, meaning-oriented cognition. Then, drawing on Muʿtazilite conceptions of reason, objective morality, and true human agency, in particular, the paper argues that contemporary AI systems, despite their impressive capabilities, do not satisfy the conditions for knowledge (ʿilm), creation (khalq), or agency (fiʿl) in the theological sense. It is argued that although they may appear “creative” or displaying origination (ihdāth) capabilities, AI systems, so far and to the extent that current developments seem to indicate, lack the essential features of ʿaql (reason), nafs (soul), rūḥ (spirit), and niyyah (intention) that Islamic theology identifies as the true, defining aspects of human beings.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/rel17060703

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Tags: #IslamicTheology #Kalam #ArtificialIntelligence #Muʿtazilism #AIEthics

𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

27 June 2026 09:35

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God and the Problem of Scepticism

By J. L. Aijian, Biola University

Contemporary debates about faith and scepticism are best understood by tracing the development of our current assumptions back to their historical roots. Scepticism, particularly in the west, has its foundation in Socrates’ famous claim that his knowledge of his own ignorance made him the wisest of men. Socrates’ intellectual humility was then translated into the Christian philosophical tradition, where it came into contact with the doctrines of divine revelation and original sin. This Element will select key historical figures to illustrate the impact that belief in God has had on how we assess the claims of scepticism, and on how scepticism impacts belief in God.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009709484

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Tags: #PhilosophyOfReligion #Scepticism #Epistemology #ChristianPhilosophy #Faith

𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

27 June 2026 09:28

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Craig’s Kalam Cosmological Argument and the Cosmic Bomb Hypothesis

By Erik J. Wielenberg, DePauw University

I examine the premises of William Craig’s influential Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA). I show that once those premises are properly understood, they can be seen to be compatible with an atheistic account according to which the universe emerged spontaneously from non-personal timeless stuff. The plausibility of such a timeless stuff scenario undermines Craig’s claim that the KCA shows that the universe was created ex nihilo by God. This is a previously unrecognized weakness of Craig’s KCA.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37977/faithphil.2026.42.2.7

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Tags: #KalamCosmologicalArgument #PhilosophyOfReligion #Atheism #Cosmology #WilliamLaneCraig

𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

27 June 2026 09:23

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The Metaphysical Transformation of Divine Infinity: From the Transcendent Infinite Being to the Plane of Immanence

By Muxiang Yan and Guangyao Wang, Soochow University

This article examines how divine infinity in Western metaphysics is re-specified through transformations in the concept of ground. Traditional metaphysics usually understands God as the first principle of the world. Yet God can function as ground not merely because He is the first cause, but because He is understood as a being that in some manner exceeds finite beings. We argue that the meaning of divine infinity depends on how God is understood as ground. To show this, the article focuses on three philosophers, Scotus, Spinoza, and Deleuze, and traces the changing forms of divine infinity across three decisive stages. First, in Scotus, God is still understood as an infinite being transcending finite creatures, yet through the univocity of being, God and finite beings enter a common conceptual field. Second, in Spinoza, God no longer appears primarily as an infinite being transcending finite beings, but is determined as absolutely infinite substance and infinite power; correspondingly, ground is no longer the first being external to nature, but becomes a productive cause immanent to nature. Finally, in Deleuze, ground is no longer borne by any substance, but is understood as the plane of immanence constituted by relations of difference and intensity; divine infinity accordingly no longer appears as a property of some ultimate being, but is transformed into the plane’s own self-sufficiency and lack of exteriority. On this basis, the article argues that modern ontology is not a simple break with the theological tradition, but rather effects within theological problems themselves a metaphysical transformation of divine infinity: as the structure of ground changes, the relations between God and world, and between the infinite and the finite, are continually rewritten.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/rel17060685

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Tags: #Metaphysics #DivineInfinity #Spinoza #Deleuze #Philosophy

𝐈 𝐇 Rᴇᴘᴏsɪᴛᴏʀʏ

27 June 2026 09:19

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Exploring Philosophical Boundaries in Seventeenth-Century Cairo: al-Munāwī’s (d. 1031/1621) Commentary on the Qaṣīdat al-Nafs

By Agnieszka Erdt, University of Jyväskylä

Al-Munāwī’s commentary, alongside that of his older contemporary Dāʾūd al-Anṭākī (d. 1008/1599), represents one of the most extensive works on the poem known as the Qaṣīdat al-nafs (Poem on the Soul), attributed to Avicenna. Al-Munāwī remains an understudied figure, best known for his hagiographical works and, more recently, his approach to Sufism. His commentary, besides the Sufi influence, demonstrates a relative openness to philosophy by a member of Cairene intellectual elites and a cautious attempt to establish its permissibility. Once this objective is achieved, al-Munāwī embarks on an encyclopaedic survey of philosophical psychology, interwoven with lexical and grammatical commentary on the poem’s verses. His commentary stands out for its reliance on authoritative sources and its intricate intertextuality, which is manifested in a dense web of quotations, crypto-quotations, paraphrases, and allusions. In comparison with other commentators who focus primarily on the Qaṣīda’s central themes, the soul’s fall and its relationship with the body, al-Munāwī’s work is notable for providing an overview of nearly every aspect of the traditional science of the soul (ʿilm al-nafs). This exploration is filtered through the reception of these doctrines by figures such as al-Ghazālī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, and others.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/jis/etag016

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Tags: #IslamicPhilosophy #Avicenna #Sufism #IslamicStudies #HistoryOfIdeas

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27 June 2026 09:09

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Bediuzzaman Said Nursi’s Dynamic Strategy for the Reconstruction of Muslim Society: A Critical Analysis

By Shumaila Majeed, Akhuwat College University Kasur

This article investigates the dynamic strategy of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi in the context of the Ottoman decline for reconstructing Muslim society. First, it outlines the historical background of the Ottoman decline and Nursi’s diagnosis of the causes of degradation of the Musim world. This is followed by a detailed discussion of his proposed solutions to counteract the problems. Nursi’s life is divided into two phases, each marked by a difference in circumstances that shaped his distinctive methodological scheme for revitalisation. This study explores the nature and reason behind the strategic change along with the process of developing a revised strategy. The article also analyses Nursi’s contribution to resist the anti-religious policies of the Turkish government. Adapting a qualitative approach, the study finds that the Muslim decline resulted from multiple factors including educational downturn, backwardness in Islamic sciences, political instability, and neglecting Islamic teachings. Nursi sought to counter these problems with faith through investigation. He had foreseen that the aggressive strategies against the government would prove counterproductive. His dynamic strategy was grounded in wisdom and adaptability, which was instrumental in countering the onslaughts of anti-religious ideologies. His works can be of great assistance to understand the problems of the Muslim world today.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.55831/ajis.v11i3.1105

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Tags: #SaidNursi #RisaleiNur #IslamicRevival #OttomanEmpire #IslamicStudies

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23 May 2026 16:26

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Rethinking Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa: Promises, Limits and Practice in Aḥmad al-Raysūnī’s Thought

By Eva Kepplinger, FAU Nürnberg-Erlangen

Increased debates over the higher objectives of Islamic law (maqāṣid al-sharīʿa) have emerged in recent decades, with considerable attention devoted to their potential for intellectual and legal reform. Nonetheless, a very prolific contemporary contributor to the maqāṣid debate, the Moroccan scholar Aḥmad al-Raysūnī (b. 1953), has received very limited attention in Western scholarship to date. Therefore, this article offers a comprehensive critical analysis of al-Raysūnī’s interpretation of the maqāṣid and its implications for contemporary Islamic normativity. Aiming to assess the relationship between al-Raysūnī’s theoretical elaborations of the maqāṣid and their practical implications, both his publications and his legal opinions (fatwas) are considered and analysed. Thus, methodologically, the article combines textual analysis of al-Raysūnī’s works with an analytical evaluation of his legal reasoning in practice. The study demonstrates that while al-Raysūnī stresses the importance of a structured maqāṣid-reasoning and suggests models for their organisation, his fatwas rarely implement these concepts directly; instead, they rely predominantly on a broader notion of public welfare (maṣlaḥa). By choosing al-Raysūnī as an example, the article argues that this tension highlights both the reformist potential and the practical limitations of contemporary maqāṣid discourse, thereby contributing to broader discussions on Islamic legal reform.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/rel17050618

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Tags: #Maqasid #Sharia #IslamicLaw #AhmadAlRaysuni #IslamicThought

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23 May 2026 16:20

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Decolonizing the Fact-Value Distinction: Reexamining Chinese Legalism (Fajia, 法家) Through Wael Hallaq’s Reconstruction of Sharīʿa

By Shuchen Xiang, Xidian University

This paper argues that the central thesis of Wael Hallaq’s The Impossible State is that traditional Islamic cultures as shaped by Sharīʿa did not abide by a fact-value distinction. Hallaq’s incisive account of traditional Islamic socio-political culture has relevant repercussions beyond the Islamic context from which he draws his conclusions. The importance of Hallaq’s project stems from how it reconstructs a specific tradition—Islam—to contest logics presented as modern and universal. His central argument, that the modern (Western) state is ultimately organized around a fact-value distinction, bears crucially on analyses of the historical Chinese state and its “modernization.” As this paper shows, the Chinese were the first to invent the modern bureaucratic state that Hallaq problematizes in his account of post-feudal European “modernity.” The critique that Hallaq makes of this modern bureaucratic state finds resonance throughout the millennia of Chinese history. Historically, the Confucians argued against the proponents of a similar fact-value distinction in political life—the “legalist” (fajia, 法家). Philosophically, the Confucians had conclusively won the debate against the legalists in dynastic China and the historic Chinese state and its political culture disavowed of the kind of fact-value distinction championed by the legalists. However, in contemporary times, due to the attempt by Western knowledge production to globalize the “modern” state, there has been a revival of legalism by Western scholars. This paper situates the revival within the context of Hallaq’s powerful critique, which frames the West’s attempt to globalize its political models as a form of epistemic colonization.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/rel17050603

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Tags: #IslamicThought #WaelHallaq #PoliticalPhilosophy #ChinesePhilosophy #Sharia

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17 May 2026 10:03

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A new Gaunilian objection to Anselm’s ‘ontological argument’

By Isabel Jahnke, University of Cambridge

Gaunilo’s ‘Lost Island’ objection to Anselm’s argument in Proslogion II famously replaces Anselm’s key phrase (“something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought”) with a phrase which describes an island. The general idea is that Anselm’s argument cannot in fact demonstrate the existence of the greatest conceivable thing. For if it did, we would surely also have to accept parallel arguments which claim to prove the apparently unlikely existence of various other greatest conceivable entities. This paper introduces a new type of Gaunilian objection. Its ‘monotheist/polytheist argument’ applies the substitution method of previous ‘parody objections’ twice, proposing that Anselm’s line of reasoning can be employed to ‘prove’ the illogical existence in reality of both one-and-only-one-thing-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought and two-things-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought. Since the two key phrases of the monotheist/polytheist argument retain Anselm’s category of ‘something’ or ‘thing’, the argument has the advantage of being invulnerable to classic objections to Gaunilian arguments which claim that Anselm’s key phrase (“something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought”) cannot legitimately be replaced by a phrase describing the greatest conceivable thing in a sub-category of things (e.g. islands) in Anselm’s argument. The core defining feature of the new objection in this paper, however, is that it makes a stronger claim than previous Gaunilian arguments. If successful, it would show that Anselm’s line of reasoning can be taken to an illogical (and not merely unlikely) conclusion. This would demonstrate indirectly that Anselm’s argument must fail.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-026-10011-x

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Tags: #Philosophy #PhilosophyOfReligion #Anselm #Ontology #Metaphysics

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11 May 2026 17:55

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From Combination to Individuation: A Sufi–Sadrian Case for the Metaphysical Possibility of Strong AI

By Enis Doko, Ibn Haldun University

This paper argues that Sufi–Sadrian metaphysics makes strong artificial intelligence metaphysically intelligible while resisting both reductive functionalism and indiscriminate panpsychism. The argument begins from the Qur’anic and Sufi rejection of a purely inert cosmos and develops through Ibn ʿArabī’s account of divine self-disclosure and Mullā Ṣadrā’s ontology of graded existence, knowledge by presence, and substantial motion. On this view, artificial systems are not barred from mentality merely because they are artifacts; what matters is not substrate alone but whether a system becomes a sufficiently unified locus of manifestation. The paper reframes the classic problem: not how micro-conscious units combine, but how a unified center of awareness becomes individuated within a living field of being. It concludes that while current AI systems may lack genuine subjectivity, future artificial minds remain metaphysically possible if they achieve sufficient integration, self-presence, and continuity—offering a distinctively Islamic framework for thinking about AI and consciousness.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/rel17050575

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Tags: #IslamicPhilosophy #Sufism #MullaSadra #AI #PhilosophyOfMind

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11 May 2026 17:51

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Divine Simplicity

By Thomas H. McCall, Asbury Theological Seminary

The doctrine of divine simplicity is a central pillar across major monotheistic traditions, including Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. This work surveys historic formulations of the doctrine, examines key philosophical and theological objections, and presents arguments in its defense. While long upheld as a means of preserving God’s absolute unity and transcendence, divine simplicity remains a site of vigorous debate in contemporary theology. By engaging both classical sources and modern critiques, the study offers a balanced exploration of the doctrine’s coherence, challenges, and enduring significance within philosophical theology.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009622059

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Tags: #Philosophy #PhilosophyOfReligion #Theology #DivineSimplicity #Metaphysics

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11 May 2026 17:47

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Reexamining Ibn Sīnā’s Proof of al-Ṣiddīqīn: A Defense of the Avicennian Formulation Against the Critiques of Transcendent Philosophy

By Mohammad Shafiei, University of Qom; Mohammad Zabihi, University of Qom

The Proof of al-Ṣiddīqīn, as one of the most influential arguments for God’s existence in Islamic philosophy and theology, has attracted significant attention since its inception, leading to multiple formulations. While Mullā Ṣadrā’s version gained widespread prominence, Ibn Sīnā’s original formulation has faced substantial criticism from later proponents of Transcendent Philosophy. This study examines whether Ibn Sīnā’s formulation truly meets the criteria of the Proof of al-Ṣiddīqīn. Using an analytical and text-based approach, the article defends the originality and adequacy of Ibn Sīnā’s argument. It argues that the criticisms can be effectively refuted through close engagement with his primary texts. The findings suggest that Ibn Sīnā’s formulation satisfies the key criteria of the proof and does not fundamentally differ from Mullā Ṣadrā’s version, instead serving as a legitimate and foundational precursor within the Islamic philosophical tradition.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.22091/JPTR.2026.15280.3508

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Tags: #IslamicPhilosophy #IbnSina #MullaSadra #Theology #PhilosophyOfReligion

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02 May 2026 18:46

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Muslim Theological Encounters with Science: Kaleidoscopes of Knowledge Over Time

By Ebrahim Moosa, University of Notre Dame

Muslim Theological Encounters with Science dismantles the ‘Islamic decline’ narrative by showing how science and theology have long coexisted in Muslim civilization. Premodern thinkers navigated enduring tensions between reason and revelation, ensuring that intellectual disagreement fostered growth rather than hostility. Modern friction between science and Muslim theology—driven by colonialism, limited scientific literacy, and the absence of a science-attuned common sense among theologians—has often, though not exclusively, stemmed from adherence to outdated theological models. The author proposes a ‘symphonic and braided’ framework for relating science and theology, treating them as distinct yet complementary languages of meaning-making. Cultivating humility and imagination emerges as essential to human understanding. By avoiding the trap of forced convergence, this framework allows science to explain the ‘how’ while theology addresses the ‘why,’ together weaving a more complex and resilient pursuit of the truth.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009308465

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Tags: #IslamicStudies #ScienceAndReligion #Theology #Philosophy #Knowledge